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ABSTRACT 
In Lane v. Franks, the U.S. Supreme Court held that public employees 
who give truthful testimony in court are protected so long as it was outside 
their ordinary job duties.1 This issue arose after ten years of the Garcetti 
rule which does not protect employee speech pursuant to their job duties- a 
nebulous topic in the digital era.2 In applying Garcetti, lower courts have 
extended it to include any speech that is a product of job duties, even if it 
would serve the public interest.3 In Lane v. Franks, the Court amended the 
employee speech doctrine to protect subpoenaed testimony that is outside 
the employee’s job duties.4 This article applauds the new exception, but ar-
gues that the Court’s ruling was too narrow. Using the principles espoused 
in the case, this article argues that the Court should have amended the 
Garcetti rule and refocused the test on the public trust rather than the em-
ployee-employer relationship. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Recently, two disparate conflicts arising from public employee speech 
were in the news. The first story was about Jason Jackler, a probationary 
officer in Middletown, New York.5 He had been present during an arrest 
when a fellow officer assaulted a suspect who was in handcuffs.6 Jackler 
followed protocol and reported what he had witnessed.7 However, in the 
department’s attempt to cover-up the abuse, Jackler was pressured by his 
superiors to withdraw the statement.8 When Jackler refused to do so, he was 
summarily fired.9 
The second story was the story Andrew Shirvell who worked as an As-
sistant Attorney General for the State of Michigan.10 Shirvell went on social 
																														 																													
1 Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2378 (2014). 
2 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423 (2006) 
3 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2376. 
4 Id. at 2374 –75. 
5 Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 229 (2d Cir. 2011).  
6 Id. at 230.  
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 231.  
9 Id. at 231-32. 
10 See Tim Martin, Andrew Shirvell, Mich Asst. AG Accused of Harassing Student, Fired, HUFFINGTON 
POST, May 25, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/08/andrew-shirvell-mich-asst_n_780587 
 2016]	 IT IS TIME TO FIRE GARCETTI	 103	
	
media and attacked the student body president of the University of Michi-
gan for being gay.11 The comments went viral and created a media fire-
storm.12 Shirvell was soon after fired for his comments.9 
In both cases, the employee sued for retaliation based upon protected 
speech.13 At the trial court level, one of the individuals won his case and the 
other lost when the courts applied the public employee speech doctrine.14  
Jackley, who had refused to lie in an official report in order to cover up 
agency abuse, lost his case because he was considered to be speaking within 
his official duties.15 Shirvell, who spewed hatred toward a class of people 
he was charged with protecting, won his case because he was not speaking 
pursuant to his official duties.16 Eventually, on appeal, both decisions were 
reversed, but not after thousands of dollars were spent, and personal and 
professional lives were devastated. 17 
Public employee speech on matters of public concern is an essential 
component to the freedom of speech.18 Public employees have a privileged 
insight into the inner workings of our government policy and its implemen-
tation, including instances of gross mismanagement, abuse, or criminal 
wrongdoing.19 Because of this position, public employees have the unique 
																														 																														 																														 																														 															
.html. 
11 Id. 
12 The Michigan Attorney General’s Office received over 20,000 complaints. See Ed White, Shirvell’s 
Anti-Gay Rants Not Protected, Court Says, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 10, 2015, http://www.freep.com 
/story/news/local/michigan/2015/01/10/anti-gay-attorney-appeal/21549113. 
13 See Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2011); Shirvell v. Dep’t of Attorney Gen., 866 N.W.2d 
478 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).  
14 See Jackler v. Byrne, 708 F. Supp. 2d 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Shirvell v. Dep’t of Attorney Gen., 866 
N.W.2d 478 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015). 
15 See Jackler v. Byrne, 708 F. Supp. 2d 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  
16 Shirvell was a matter of public concern. See Shirvell v. Dep’t of Attorney Gen., 866 N.W.2d 706, 735 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2015).  
17 See Jackler, 658 F.3d at 228 (2d Cir. 2011). Cf. Bowie v. Maddox (Bowie II), 653 F.3d 45, 48 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (holding that employee termination based upon her refusal to testify falsely in favor of his 
employer was not protected because it was within her job duties to testify) (“[T]he illegality of a gov-
ernment employer's order does not necessarily mean the employee has a cause of action under the First 
Amendment when he contravenes that order.”). 
18 Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2373–83 (2014) (holding that a public employee’s truthful testimony 
compelled by subpoenaed and outside the of ordinary job duties is protected by the First Amendment). 
19 E.g. U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., BLOWING THE WHISTLE: BARRIERS TO FEDERAL EMPLOYEES 
MAKING DISCLOSURES 4 (2011), http://www.mspb.gov/netsearch/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber=662503 
&version=664475 (referencing a 2010 survey of 40,000 federal workers, 11.1% of respondents claimed 
to have observed wasteful activity in their agency within the last 12 months); ETHICS RES. CTR., 
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT ETHICS SURVEY: AN INSIDE VIEW OF PUBLIC SECTOR ETHICS 1-2 (2008), 
http://www.whistleblowers.org/storage/whistleblowersdocuments/ethicsresourcecentersuvery.pdf (refer-
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ability to inform the public and help the public hold the government ac-
countable.20 Ten years ago, the United States Supreme Court narrowed pro-
tection for public employees, offering no First Amendment protection when 
the employee spoke pursuant to his or her job duties.21 The Garcetti rule 
exempting speech made “pursuant to his or her job duties”22 was meant to 
create a bright-line rule as to when an employee is not protected. But in the 
current work environment, ‘job duties’ is a nebulous concept and has only 
made it more difficult for public employees to discern if they have any free 
speech protection.23 Lower courts have extended this exception greatly and 
in many cases where employee speech would be in the public interest, the 
speech is not protected.24 Essentially, public employees now give up their 
free speech rights when they take employ with the government,25 and it is 
the public that pays the price.26 
In the recent case of Lane v. Franks, the U.S. Supreme Court did not ad-
dress the Garcetti dilemma. Instead the Court created only a narrow excep-
tion for when employees truthfully testify in court.27 This exception is laud-
able and a step in the right direction, but the court did not answer the 
fundamental problems with the public employee speech doctrine, post-
Garcetti.28 
Accordingly, this article examines the Court’s most recent public em-
ployee speech case and argues that the Court should revisit the Garcetti 
rule. First, the article outlines the case of Lane v. Franks and the new excep-
tion to the Garcetti rule.29 Then the article discusses the public employee 
speech doctrine and the narrowing of protection for public employee speech 
																														 																														 																														 																														 															
encing a study that found nearly 60% of public employees surveyed had claimed to witness at least one 
incident of mismanagement in the last 12 months). 
20 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968) (holding that teachers who are informed about 
school funding are essential to the public debate on the matter). 
21 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (holding that speech made pursuant to official job 
duties did not receive First Amendment protection). 
22 Id. at 423. 
23 See discussion infra Part III.C. 
24 See discussion infra Part III.C.  
25 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
26 See discussion infra Part III.C; see also Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that 
the ruling “provides employees with an incentive to voice their concerns publicly before talking frankly 
to their superiors,” the opposite of what is meant to balance free speech with government efficiency). 
27 See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2378–79 (2014). 
28 See discussion infra Part IV. 
29 See discussion infra Part II. 
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on matters of public concern after Garcetti.30 Finally, the article argues that 
the principles espoused in Lane point toward a need to modify Garcetti fur-
ther and offers a new legal test for public employee speech.31 
II. THE TRUTHFUL TESTIMONY EXCEPTION: LANE V. FRANKS  
Edward Lane worked for Central Alabama Community College (CACC) 
as its Director of Community Intensive Training for Youth (CITY).32 He 
oversaw the operations of the program including hiring and firing and deci-
sions regarding its finances.33 The program had significant financial diffi-
culties, so Lane decided to audit it.34 The audit revealed that an employee 
who was on the CITY payroll as a counselor was not reporting to her job.35  
Lane reported this issue to the president of CACC and its counsel and told 
them that he wanted to fire the employee.36 The president and council 
warned against it, fearing that it would have negative repercussions on the 
organization and Lane—as the counselor in question was also an Alabama 
State Representative.37 
Nonetheless, Lane moved forward and contacted the Representative and 
told her that she had to report her job, but she refused to do so.38  Subse-
quently, Lane fired the employee.39 The Representative’s termination 
prompted an FBI investigation into her employment with the organization.40 
As a result, Lane was subpoenaed to appear in front of a grand jury to tes-
tify as to why he fired the Representative.41 
The grand jury eventually indicted the Representative on charges of mail 
fraud and theft concerning a program that receives federal funding.42 She 
																														 																													
30 See discussion infra Part III. 
31 See discussion infra Part IV. 
32 See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2375. (stating that Lane worked with underprivileged youth in the CITY Pro-
gram). 
33 Id. (noting that Lane was hired on a probationary basis). 
34 Id. 
35 See id. 
36 Id. 
37 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2375. The Alabama State Representative was named Suzanne Schmitz. Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. (indicating that the representative told another CITY that she was going to get back at Lane by 
denying any money requests that the organization made to the legislature). 
40 Id. 
41 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2375. 
42 U.S. v. Schmitz, 634 F.3d 1247, 1256–1257 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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had allegedly collected over $175,000 of federal funds, though she had not 
performed any tasks.43 During the trial, Lane was again subpoenaed to tes-
tify.44 The Representative was eventually found guilty on all but one count 
and she was sentenced to 30 months in prison and to pay back all funds she 
received.45  
During the legal proceedings for the Representative, Franks had become 
the president of CACC.46  Lane remained with the CITY program, but the 
organization continued to have financial difficulties.47 As a result, Lane 
recommended to Franks that he make layoffs.48 Franks took the advice and 
terminated 29 probationary employees- including Lane.49 Franks eventually 
rescinded all but 2 of the terminations,50 with Lane’s termination remaining 
in effect.51 Franks justified Lane’s termination by arguing that Lane was a 
member of management, not an hourly employee.52 
Lane sued Franks in federal court alleging “retaliation for his testimony 
against [the Representative].”53 The District Court granted Franks’ sum-
mary judgement.54 The court applied the Garcetti rule and held that Franks 
had qualified immunity from damages because “a reasonable government 
official in his position would not have had reason to believe that the Consti-
tution protected [Lane’s] testimony.”55 The court argued that Lane was act-
																														 																													
43 See generally Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2375 (noting that a jury failed to reach a verdict in Schmitz’s first 
trial, at which Lane testified, and Schmitz was retried six months later, at which Lane was again subpoe-
naed to testify); Id. at 1256-1257. 
44 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2375.  
45 Id. at 2375; Schmitz, 634 F.3d at 1258 (sentencing Schmitz to thirty months’ imprisonment on each 
count of conviction, to run concurrently, for a total of thirty months and ordering Schmitz to pay restitu-
tion in the amount of $177,251.82).  
46 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2376 (stating that Steven Franks became president of CACC in January 2008). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2376 (noting that Franks rescinded the terminations of the other employees “be-
cause of an ‘ambiguity in [those other employees’] probationary service”).  
52 Id. at 2376 (noting that Franks claimed that he did not rescind Lane’s termination because Lane was a 
managerial employee and not an hourly employee, who cannot be terminated without cause. The CITY 
program was subsequently eliminated, all employees were let go, and Franks retired). 
53 Id. at 2376; see id. at 2376 n.2 (noting that Lane also brought suit under a state whistleblower statute, 
ALA. CODE § 36-26A-3 (2013)). 
54 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2372. 
55 Id. at 2376 (applying Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410). 
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ing within his official duties because he had learned the information while 
working for CITY.56 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the ruling stating that even if the 
speech is not required as part of his official duties, the speech is a product 
of his official duties.57 The court held that Lane’s speech was about his in-
vestigation of the Representative while he was her supervisor, thus it was a 
product of his official duties.58 Lane then appealed the case to the U.S. Su-
preme Court which granted certiorari.59 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the First Amendment protected public 
employees from retaliation when they were subpoenaed to testify and pro-
vide truthful information, if it was outside the course of their ordinary job 
duties.60 In its analysis, the Court applied the public employee speech doc-
trine. First, it examined whether court testimony in a case of federal fraud 
against a state representative is “a matter of public concern.”61 The Court 
said that sworn testimony is the “quintessential” form of speaking as a citi-
zen and is independent of an employee’s obligation to his or her employer.62  
To illustrate the point, the Court cited the federal perjury statute: “Anyone 
who testifies in court bears an obligation, to the court and society at large, 
to tell the truth.”63 
Next, the Court examined whether the speech was pursuant to the job du-
ties.64 The Court clarified the Garcetti rule stating that “speech that simply 
relates to public employment or concerns information learned in the course 
of public employment”65 is not necessarily free from protection. The crux of 
the Garcetti rule is that speech falls within a person’s job duties, not that the 
speech is a product of a person’s job duties.66 The Court then distinguished 
																														 																													
56 See id. 
57 Id. at 2372.  
58 Id. 
59 See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377. 
60 Id. at 2369, 2377 (stating that the lower courts have been divided, and that the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari, resolving the issue on whether public employees may suffer adverse employment conse-
quences for providing truthful subpoenaed testimony).  
61 See id. at 2379 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1623, which criminalizes false statements under oath, and elaborat-
ing on how this applies to Lane). 
62 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379. 
63 See id. 
64 Id.  
65 Id.  
66 See id. 
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Lane’s case from Garcetti v. Ceballos. In Garcetti, the employee prepared 
an internal memo which he was paid to do.67 Lane was testifying in court, 
which was “outside the scope of his ordinary job duties.”68 Finally, the 
Court examined whether the government employer had a legitimate reason 
for treating the employee differently than an ordinary citizen.69 The Court 
referred back to Connick v. Myers70 and stated that “a stronger showing [of 
government interests] may be necessary if the employee’s speech more sub-
stantially involve[s] matters of public concern.”71 The Court held that the 
government employer showed no evidence that Lane’s testimony contained 
sensitive information or was not truthful.72 Thus, the Court overturned the 
Eleventh Circuit’ ruling and created a narrow exception for truthful testi-
mony compelled by subpoena that is outside the employee’s ordinary job 
duties.73 
III.  EVOLUTION OF THE EMPLOYEE SPEECH DOCTRINE  
Traditionally, public employees had no job protection and could be fired 
at will.74  Oliver Wendell Holmes expressed the view of the judiciary of the 
era: “a policeman may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but has no 
constitutional right to be a policeman.”75 Essentially, the government forced 
employees to trade their constitutional rights for their jobs.76  There was a 
constitutional right to free speech, but no constitutional right to work for the 
government.77   
																														 																													
67 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006). 
68 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2374–75 (2014). 
69 Id. at 2380 (holding that an assistant district attorney’s questionnaire about workplace satisfaction was 
not speech on a matter of public concern) (internal citations omitted).  
70 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (2016). 
71 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2381. 
72 Id. (dealing with qualified immunity for Franks and holding that since no courts had ruled on this is-
sue, Franks could not have been aware of the Lane’s protection, thus he had qualified immunity. The 
Court upheld the 11th Circuit’s decision).  
73  See id. at 2383. 
74 Connick, 461 U.S. at 183. “[T]he unchallenged dogma was that a public employee had no right to 
object to conditions placed upon the terms of employment—including those which restricted the exer-
cise of constitutional rights.” Id. 
75 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892) (holding that a police officer could 
not be fired for joining political activist group).  
76  See id.  
77 Alder v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952) (“We think that a municipal employer is not disabled 
because it is an agency of the State from inquiring of its employees as to matters that may prove relevant 
to their fitness and suitability for the public service.”); Garner v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Los Angeles, 341 
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1. EXPANDING PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH PROTECTION  
Through the 1950s, government employees had absolutely no free speech 
protections, including being forced to sign ‘loyalty oaths,’ stating that they 
were not Communists, as a condition of employment.78  A line of United 
States Supreme Court cases in the 1960s overturned state statutes that re-
quired loyalty oaths as a condition of employment, and for the first time the 
Court recognized public employees maintained a right to free speech.79 In 
1968, the United State Supreme Court addressed the conflict between the 
government’s desire for efficiency and the bureaucrat’s dual role as citizen 
and employee. In Pickering v. Board of Education, a public school teacher 
was fired for writing a letter that criticized the school board’s managing of 
financial resources.80 The Court held that without proof that the statements 
were false, the teacher could not be dismissed from public employment for 
making comments of public concern.81 The Court noted that public employ-
ees do not give up their First Amendment rights when they take a govern-
ment position.82 
In Pickering, the Court forwarded a balancing test for employee speech: 
the interests of government employees (commenting on matters of public 
concern) must be balanced against the interests of the government employer 
(promoting efficiency of public services).83  The Court found that school fi-
nancing was a matter of public concern on which the teacher could speak 
informatively.84 Furthermore, her letter was not person specific, thus, daily 
school operations would not be affected.85  The Court also rejected the gov-
																														 																														 																														 																														 															
U.S. 716, 719 (1951) (stating the city could require its employees to divulge past or present membership 
in the Communist Party).  
78 See Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on Matters of Public 
Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43, 44 n.10 (1988). 
79 See generally Wiemann v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Cramp v. Bd. Of Pub. Instruction, 368 
U.S. 278 (1961); Keyishian v. Board of Regents of University of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
The following year, the Court used similar language to protect the political speech of high school stu-
dents. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (“It can hardly be 
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression 
at the schoolhouse gate.”). 
80 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968). 
81 Id. at 574.  
82 Id.  
83 Id.at 568. 
84 Id. at 569–70. 
85 Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 569–70 (1968). 
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ernment’s argument that the teacher had a working relationship with the 
school board that required loyalty.86 
The concept of a public employee speaking on a matter of public concern 
was not new to the high court. In Garrison v. Louisiana, the Court used this 
analysis to overturn defamation charges against a state attorney general who 
had called a panel of judges ‘lazy.’87 The Court argued that the judges’ tru-
ancy had been the cause of a great backlog of cases and it was a matter of 
public concern.88 In Wood v. Georgia, the Court used the same legal con-
cept to overturn a contempt charge against a sheriff who was reprimanded 
for criticizing a racist judge’s grandstanding in court for political gain.89 
Over the next twenty years, the U.S. Supreme Court continued to apply 
the Pickering test in favor of free speech rights. In Perry v. Sindermann,90 a 
college professor at a Texas public junior college had picketed to have the 
college become a four year institution.91 He was subsequently fired by the 
administration for his actions.92 The Court held that despite being on a one 
year contract, renewal could not be denied based solely upon the em-
ployee’s speech on a matter of public concern.93 In Givhan v. W. Line Con-
sol. Sch. Dist, a Mississippi teacher was fired after he went to the princi-
pal’s private office to complain about the alleged racist policies of the 
school district.94 The Court held that public employees do not lose their 
constitutionally protected speech rights when they communicate with their 
employer privately.95  
In Rankin v. McPherson, the plaintiff, considered an officer of the law, 
upon hearing of the attempted assassination of President Reagan, told a co-
worker that if there was another attempt, she hoped that “they get him.”96  
																														 																													
86 Id. at 570. 
87 See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
88 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574 (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964); Wood v. Geor-
gia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962))(“[S]tatements … on matters of public concern must be accorded First 
Amendment protection despite the fact that the statements are directed at their nominal superiors.”). 
89 See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962). 
90 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).  
91 Id. at 595.  
92 Id.  
93 See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 678 (1996) (extending this protection to include 
independent contractors hired by the government); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 596 
(1972).  
94 See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979). 
95  Id. at 415–16.  
96 Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 381 (1987). 
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The co-worker reported the comments to the officer’s supervisor and the 
speaker was subsequently fired.97 The Court held that an employee’s free 
speech protection includes controversial topics and reversed the decision.98 
While these cases show the Pickering test allowed the courts to expand pro-
tected speech for public employees, the Court would soon rein in the scope 
of protected speech. 
2. NARROWING PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH PROTECTION  
 In Connick v. Myers,99 assistant district attorney Myers had worked in 
the office for many years.100 Connick had been recently elected to be attor-
ney general and decided to reorganize the office.101  Myers circulated a flyer 
claiming that the reorganization was politically motivated.102  Connick felt 
the flyer was insubordination and fired her.103 Myers brought suit believing 
that she was fired for exercising her free speech rights.104  
In a 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the claim of free 
speech protection,105 and modified the Pickering test. The new legal test be-
came: 1.) the employee must demonstrate that the speech was a matter of 
public concern. If that is not affirmed, then 2.) the government employer 
must establish the speech was also disruptive to the operation.106 The Court 
stated that in order to decide whether speech is on a matter of public con-
cern, a court must examine “content, form and context” of the speech.107 In 
Connick, the Court held that the employee failed on the first prong of the 
test as the flyer did not contain speech on a matter of public concern.108   
																														 																													
97 Id. at 381–382. 
98 See id. at 392, 384 (“Vigilance is necessary to ensure that public employers do not use authority over 
employees to silence discourse, not because it hampers public functions but simply because superiors 
disagree with the content of employee’s speech.”). 
99 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).  
100 Id. at 140. 
101 See id. at 140–141. 
102 Id. at 141. 
103 Id. 
104 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141 (1983). 
105 Id. at 139. 
106 See id. at 152–154. 
107 Id. at 147–48. 
108 Id. at 147 (“We hold only that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public 
concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual cir-
cumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel 
decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior.”). 
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In Waters v. Churchill,109 an employer overheard a nurse make a nega-
tive comment about the public hospital at which she worked. The nurse was 
fired for her speech, despite the fact that what she said was in dispute.110 
The Court determined that an employee can be terminated if an employer 
had a ‘good faith’ belief that he or she actually made the comments.111 
However, the burden of proof rests upon the government to show ‘good 
faith.’112 In San Diego v. Roe, a police officer sued for retaliation after he 
had been fired for selling a homemade sex video in which he appeared 
dressed as a police officer.113  The officer claimed that he could not be fired 
for speech that he made during his own time and not pertaining to his job.114 
The Court disagreed and held that this speech was related to his job and was 
detrimental to the department.115 The modification of the Pickering test in 
Connick marked the end of broad speech protections for public employees 
and ushered in a more narrow interpretation of First Amendment protection 
for public employee speech. The Court would modify the rule of law even 
further in Garcetti v. Ceballos.  
3. JOB DUTIES THRESHOLD: GARCETTI V. CEBALLOS  
Ceballos was the supervising district attorney in the Los Angeles (CA) 
County Office.116 His duties required him to review prosecutions pursued 
by the office.117 Ceballos reviewed an affidavit from the Sheriff about a 
search and found flaws in the document.118 He reported his findings in a 
memo to the District Attorney and alleged wrongdoing by the Sheriff.119  
The District Attorney ignored Ceballos’ memo and continued the prosecu-
tion and the trial court decided to let in the evidence recovered by the Sher-
iff.120  Subsequently, Ceballos was demoted.121  Ceballos claimed that he 
was demoted because of his speech in the memo and sued the county for 
																														 																													
109 Waters v. Churchill 511 U.S. 661 (1994).  
110 Id. at 666. 
111 Id. at 677. 
112 See id. 
113 City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 78 (2004). 
114 Id. at 79–80. 
115 Id. at 81. 
116 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413 (2006). 
117 Id. at 413–14. 
118 Id. at 414. 
119 Id. at 414. 
120 Id. at 414–15. 
121 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 415 (2006). 
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violating his free speech rights.122 
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that Ceballos’ free speech 
rights were not violated because he made his remarks in his official capac-
ity as an employee, and employees do “not speak[ ] as citizens for First 
Amendment purposes.”123 Justice Kennedy noted that “[w]hen a citizen en-
ters government service, the citizen by necessity must accept certain limita-
tions on his or her freedom.”124 The person is no longer acting as a citizen 
as he or she is now a paid employee.125  Nonetheless, public employees still 
retain broader rights of free speech outside the scope of employment.126  
Garcetti modified the public employee speech doctrine so that before the 
content of the speech is analyzed to determine if it is a matter of public con-
cern, courts must first examine whether the speaker was acting within his or 
her official duties.127 If an employee speaks in his or her official capacity, 
then there is no First Amendment protection.128 Note, the courts have not 
clearly defined the scope of employ, but listed job duties has often been 
cited.129   
If the employee was not speaking pursuant to his or her job duties, then 
courts are to apply the Pickering/Connick test.  So, if the employee’s speech 
is not a matter of public concern, then there is no First Amendment protec-
tion.130  Public concern is usually determined in a case-by-case basis, but 
past examples have pertained to systemic behaviors in an agency, such as 
discrimination or corruption.131 If the speech is of public concern, then it 
may be protected. This type of speech may include content that is offensive 
																														 																													
122 Id. at 415. 
123 Id. at 421. 
124 Id. at 418. 
125 Id.  at 418–19 (“[G]overnment offices could not function if every employment decision became a 
constitutional matter.” (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983)).  
126 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006). 
127 Id. at 418.  
128 Id. 
129 Elizabeth Dale, Employee Speech & Management Rights: A Counterintuitive Reading of Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175, 212–13 (2008). (noting that the Court in Garcetti pre-
sented several phrases that may describe the term “employee,” including “professional responsibilities,” 
“professional capacity,” “performing . . . job duties,” “tasks . . . paid to perform,” “official duties,” “of-
ficial responsibilities,” and “employment duties.”). 
130 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983).  
131 David Hudson, Balancing Act: Public Employees and Free Speech, 3 FIRST REPORTS 1, 
24–25 (2002), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/madison/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/FirstReport 
.PublicEmployees.pdf. 
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and speech from private conversations.132   
Only if the above tests are met does a court compare the interests of the 
employer with the importance of the speech.133 For example, speech per-
taining to whistle blowing would usually outweigh any government interest 
(and is statutorily protected in 49 states and the Federal Government).134  In 
this step, a court will look at the context of the speech to evaluate if the 
time, place or manner of the speech disrupted the employer’s objective.135 
Examples of disruptions include impairing the harmony among co-workers, 
impairing necessitated loyalty, or interfering with operations.136   
An employee’s speech on a matter of public concern can be reprimanded, 
without First Amendment implication, so long as the punishment is not a 
discharge, demotion or transfer.137 Additionally, if the speech of public con-
cern is only one component that led to the punishment, and the government 
can show that the employee would have been fired absent the speech, then 
there is no First Amendment claim.138   
4. GARCETTI DILEMMA: PROTECTING EMPLOYER RETALIATION     
Since Garcetti, lower courts have used the ‘scope of employment’ prong 
extensively.139 The most difficult application of this prong are cases where 
job descriptions are not well defined.140 But, if courts can find the speech 
has the slightest connection to job duties, then the plaintiff rarely pre-
																														 																													
132 Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on 
Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L. J. 43, 43–45 (1988). 
133 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983). 
134 See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Silencing Government Employee Whistleblowers in the Name of ‘Effi-
ciency,’ 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 17, 68 (1996).  
135 Connick, 428 U.S. at 153.  
136 Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974). 
137 See Hudson, supra note 131 at 32. 
138 Mt. Healthy Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285 (1977) (holding that the government 
show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have come to the same decision to 
terminate despite the constitutionally protected speech).  
139 At the end of 2015, Garcetti had been cited in over 2,500 cases, Citing References: Garcetti v. Ce-
ballos, WESTLAW (last visited Jan. 5, 2016). 
140 Thomas Keenan, Circuit Court Interpretations of Garcetti v. Ceballos and the Development of Pub-
lic Employee Speech, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 841, 842 (2011) (noting that circuit courts held “con-
cluding that an employee's speech falls within or without his or her official duties has become an inde-
terminate affair.”). See generally Mary L. Conrow, Managing Municipal Employee and Employer Rights 
in the Technological Age, in Navigating Municipal Employment Issues, ASPATORE, 2011 WL 6740830 
(Dec. 2011) (detailing the nebulous concept of job duties in the digital age). 
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vails.141 The following cases blur the already uncertain line between what is 
in public interest and what is managerial prerogative.    
a. Law Enforcement Cases  
The Southern District of New York upheld the termination of a safety of-
ficer that was disciplined for writing a report detailing health and environ-
mental threats to the community.142 The court held that since employee was 
the precinct’s safety officer, his reports were within his official duties.143  In 
Ohio, the federal court upheld the termination of a police officer that was 
fired for complaining about cuts in canine-training.144 The court held that, 
as chief canine officer, his complaint was within his official duties.145 In 
Maryland, one federal court upheld the firing of a police chief, who while 
off-duty but at the station, had sent an e-mail to the mayor complaining 
about misuse of fleet vehicles.146 The court determined the off-duty email 
was a continuation of an earlier discussion about the fleet that was under his 
command and therefore within the scope of his employment.147  The major-
ity of post-Garcetti cases involving law enforcement have held that investi-
gations of misconduct are part of law enforcement’s job and thus any re-
lated speech is not protected.148   
b. Speech Through Official Channels  
The Tenth Circuit upheld the termination of a superintendent of schools 
who reported to the school board violations of state and federal law in the 
Head Start program.149 The superintendent also instructed subordinates to 
report the violations.150 The court reasoned that supervising the Head Start 
program was within the superintendent’s job duties.151 However, the court 
determined the superintendent’s speech to the District Attorney about the 
																														 																													
141 See Keenan, supra note 140. 
142 Ruotolo v. New York, No. 03 Civ. 5045, 2006 WL 2033662 (S.D.N.Y July 19, 2006). 
143 Id. at 1. 
144 Haynes v. City of Circleville, 474 F.3d 357 (6th Cir. 2007).  
145 Id. at 364. 
146 Franklin v. Clark, 454 F. Supp. 2d 356, 359–61, 372 (D. Md. 2006). 
147 Id. at 360–61. 
148 See generally, Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial Preroga-
tive, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (2008) (outlining several cases of public employee speech from the law 
enforcement context). 
149 Casey v. West Las Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist., 473 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir. 2007).  
150 Id. at 1326. 
151 Id. at 1329.  
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school board’s violation of open meeting laws was protected because it was 
outside of her job duties.152  
The Tenth Circuit also upheld a city council’s termination of police offi-
cers who had reported that the police chief had improperly influenced 
criminal charges against family and friends to disappear.153 The officers had 
first reported the misconduct to a union representative who then reported it 
to the state attorney general’s office.154 The court held that it was part of the 
officers’ job duties to report to the attorney general’s office, thus they were 
speaking within their official capacity and not protected.155  If an em-
ployee’s job duties requires he or she to report to officials, the speech will 
not be protected even if it serves the public interest. 
c. Speech Concerning Public Safety  
The Seventh Circuit held that a prison guard was speaking in her official 
capacity when she reported to her supervisor that colleagues were possibly 
smuggling contraband, since her job duties included prison security.156 
Therefore, she could not proceed on a retaliation charge against her internal 
transfer.157  The Eastern District Court of Michigan upheld the termination 
of an employee that complained to a county labor relations director about a 
co-worker’s safety violation.158 The plaintiff had already reported to her 
employer about the safety violations and stated that she believed the em-
ployee would not be punished because that employee was having an affair 
with the supervisor.159 The plaintiff was subsequently fired for creating a 
disrespectful work environment.160 The court held that she as not protected 
under the whistleblower’s act because she did not report it to a public body, 
it was not a matter of public concern, and the government employer had 
substantial reason to terminate her.161   
In Foley v. Randolph, a fire chief in Randolph, Massachusetts held a 
																														 																													
152 Id. at 1332–33.  
153 Cheek v. City of Edwardsville, 324 F. App’x. 699 (10th Cir. 2008).  
154 Id. at 700.  
155 Id. at 701.  
156 Spiegla v. Hull, 481 F.3d 961, 965 (7th Cir. 2007).  
157 Id. at 967. 
158 Jennings v. Cty. of Washtenaw, 475 F. Supp. 2d 692 (E.D. Mich. 2007).  
159 Id. at 698.   
160 Id. at 700. 
161 Id. at 706–07, 714 (“The point of protection afforded public employees is to allow public employees 
a voice on issues actually affecting and of interest to the community at large.”).  
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press after a fire that claimed the lives of two children.162 The State Fire 
Marshal, with the help of Foley and Sgt. Frank McGinn, held a press con-
ference so that the press could inform the public of the incident.163 Shortly 
after the press conference, the fire chief received a 15-day suspension with-
out pay.164 He sued the city claiming that he was a citizen speaking on a 
matter of public concern.165  The First Circuit upheld the suspension claim-
ing that holding a press conference was part of his “official duties” as a fire 
chief.166  All of these cases show the job duties threshold of the Garcetti 
rule can lead to varying results for public employees and does not clearly 
show what speech is protected under the First Amendment.  
IV.  LANE V. FRANKS: WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN   
In Lane, the Court reiterated the well-settled principle that there is sig-
nificant value in allowing public employee speech because they are often in 
the best position to report government maleficence.167  Public employees 
“are uniquely qualified to comment” on “matters concerning government 
policies that are of interest to the public at large.”168  Moreover, the public’s 
interest in “addressing official wrongdoing and threats to health [and] 
safety…outweighs the government’s stake in [efficiency.]”169  Protecting 
public employee speech is not about protecting the employee’s First 
Amendment right, as much as it is about protecting “the public’s interest in 
receiving informed opinion”170 about the government that it elects, funds, 
and empowers.    
																														 																													
162 Foley v. Randolph, 598 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010). 
163 Id. at 2. 
164 Id. at 4. 
165 Id. (claiming a first amendment violation requires that Foley was speaking about a matter of public 
concern in his role as a citizen). 
166 Id. at 10. 
167 Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2377 (2014) (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994) 
(plurality opinion)).  The Court argued that public employee speech holds “special value” because the 
employees gain critical information due to their privileged position in the government. Id. at 2379.  
168 Id. at 2380.  (stating that this principle is even stronger in cases of public corruption as is found in 
Lane v. Franks). 
169 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 428 (2006).  
170 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377 (quoting San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam)).  Erwin 
Chemerinksy, The Rookie Year of the Roberts Court & a Look Ahead: Civil Rights, 34 PEPP L. REV. 
535, 539 (2007) (arguing that Garcetti “is not only a loss of free speech rights for millions of govern-
ment employees, but it is really a loss for the general public, who are much less likely to learn of gov-
ernment misconduct.”).  
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Despite the rhetoric of protecting the public interest, the Court wrote a 
narrow opinion in Lane, which only applied to “[t]ruthful testimony under 
oath by a public employee outside the scope of his ordinary job duties.”171  
The decision gives an important exception to Garcetti and it is to be ap-
plauded. However, the Court has not corrected the problem of limiting em-
ployee speech based upon the nebulous definition of job duties. Now, the 
Court will have to continue, on a case-by-case basis, to decide whether pub-
lic employee speech that is a product of employment, and deals with mat-
ters of public concern, is protected. 
1. IMPLIED RECOGNITION OF THE GARCETTI DILEMMA  
In its analysis of the case, the Court in Lane did not start with the first 
prong of the public employee speech doctrine created in Garcetti. Instead, 
the Court first analyzed whether or not Lane’s testimony was a matter of 
public concern. The Court focused on the importance of testimony in court 
as “quintessential speech as a citizen that outweighs any obligation to his 
employer.”172 The Court impliedly dismissed the primacy of the job duties 
element by claiming that “Garcetti said nothing about speech that simply 
relates to public employment or concerns information learned in the course 
of public employment.”173  It seems as though the Court was creating an ex-
ception to circumvent the concept of “job duties,” which the lower courts 
have extended to include speech that is a product of one’s employ.174  
In Garcetti, Justice Stevens wrote in dissent: “[t]he notion that there is a 
categorical difference between speaking as a citizen and speaking in the 
course of one’s employment is quite wrong.”175 Despite the Court’s inter-
pretation in Lane, the rule of Garcetti is clear in that the determination of 
speech protection is based upon whether the employee spoke as an em-
ployee at all.176 It does not matter if the person was in some degree speaking 
																														 																													
171 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2378. 
172 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379.  
173 Id. 
174Adams v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 752 F. Supp. 2d 420, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Weintraub v. 
Board of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 2010)) (holding "speech can be made ‘pursuant to’ a public 
employee’s job duties even though it is not required by, or included in, the employee’s job description, 
or in request by the employer”). 
175 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 427 (2006).  
176 See id.; see also Eric Marshall, Rescuing the Union Grievance from the Shoals of Garcetti: A Call 
for the Return to Reason in Public Workplace Speech Jurisprudence, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 905, 907 
(2013) (arguing that Garcetti misconstrued Pickering by claiming that the ‘citizen’ requirement implied 
the ‘job duties’ exception to First Amendment protection). 
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as a citizen.177 There is no balancing test: if the person was speaking as an 
employee, at all, then there is no protection.178 But this dichotomy is false 
as, more often than not, when an employee speaks about matters pertaining 
to his or her job, then it is going to have some degree of public concern.  
But too often, lower courts are using this ‘bright-line’ rule of whether the 
employee was acting within his or her duties as the sole determinate as to 
whether speech is protected.  This rule assumes that a public employee 
ceases to be a citizen when he or she is working, which goes against the 
well-established principles of the public employee speech precedence.179 As 
the facts of Lane illustrate, this dichotomy is rarely the case. It is difficult to 
determine, or believe, that Lane fired the Representative solely because it 
was within his job duties. It is just as reasonable that Lane believed the 
Representative was wasting taxpayer money by committing fraud.  
Moreover, “formal job description[s] often bear little resemblance to the 
duties an employee actually is expected to perform.”180 The Court in Lane, 
alluded to this when it spoke about the difference in speech pursuant to job 
duties and speech that is a product of your job duties.181 The holding in 
Lane is that the former is never protected and the latter can be protected.182 
Yet, the majority gives no real distinction as to when public employee 
speech is one and not the other.  Presumably, the Court was unwilling to 
elucidate this, as it is rarely clear because employees do so much work be-
yond their official job duties.183 In Lane, the Court should have given 
clearer directions as to when speech derived from one’s employ is pro-
tected. Instead, all we know is that truthful testimony will be protected.184   
2. SOLVING THE GARCETTI DILEMMA: A NEW PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEE SPEECH TEST  
Government agencies do need some control over their employees in or-
																														 																													
177 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427. 
178  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
179 Public employees, moreover, often occupy trusted positions in society. When they speak out, they 
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180 Id. at 424–25.  
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der for the government to function efficiently.185 However, interest in effi-
cient government should counterbalance, not outweigh the public’s interest 
in receiving information about the government.186 When discussing matters 
of public concern, employees should always have First Amendment protec-
tion.187 There was no previous constitutional basis for creating a categorical 
line that does not protect a public employee when acting pursuant to his or 
her official duties as the Court did in Garcetti.188 It is only speech that is not 
of a matter of public concern or that poses a serious threat to the administra-
tion of the government, which should not be protected.189  
The U.S. Supreme Court should modify the public employee speech doc-
trine and reconsider the Constitutional principles it is trying to promote.  
The first prong of the public employee speech doctrine should return to: 1.) 
whether the employee speaking on a matter of public concern.190  If the em-
ployee was not speaking on a matter of public concern, then there should be 
no constitutional protection for the employee.191   
If the employee was speaking on a matter of public concern, then the 
next question should be: 2.) whether the employee speaking solely as a citi-
zen.192 If the employee was speaking solely as a citizen, then the speech 
should be protected unless there was articulable evidence that the speech 
would do serious harm to the public interest in government operation. If the 
employee was not speaking purely as a citizen, then there should be lesser 
																														 																													
185 Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. at 2380 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418). 
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191 See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004). 
192 Steven J. Stafstrom, Jr., Government Employee, Are You A "Citizen"?: Garcetti v. Ceballos and the 
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would be similar to the first prong of intermediate scrutiny. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 
(1968) (holding that regulation against destroying draft card survived intermediate scrutiny and was in-
cidental to the speech). 
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scrutiny and the question becomes: 3) whether the government agency had 
an important “justification for treating the employee differently from any 
other member of the general public.”193  
This new test would put the focus back on the “matter of public concern” 
element, rather than the “citizen” element of the doctrine.194 Furthermore, 
the test would still make a distinction between speech that is product of em-
ploy versus speech as a citizen, but speech that derives from employment 
could receive protection. It would also remove the nebulous “job duties” 
concept.195 The last prong of the test would reassert the Pickering balancing 
test to allow for government efficiency.  But, in this new balancing test, the 
focus would be on the public’s interest in effective government versus the 
agency’s self-interest in avoiding embarrassment or criticism.    
Thus, in cases of citizen speech, the speech would have a preferred posi-
tion over the management’s prerogative, unless the citizen speech would 
harm the public interest in government efficacy.196 So, in the case of An-
drew Shirvell and his attack on the University of Michigan president, there 
is a strong argument that his homophobic speech, which he did as a citizen, 
was disruptive to the public interest in the operation of that office, because 
that office is charged with enforcing anti-discrimination laws.197   
																														 																													
193 See Curtis R. Summers, U.S. Supreme Court Clarifies First Amendment Citizen Speech Protections 
for Government Employees, HUSCH BLACKWELL: BUSINESS INSIGHTS (Jan. 23, 2016, 7:00 PM), http:// 
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to Reason in Public Workplace Speech Jurisprudence, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 905, 912–13 (2013). 
195 Government agencies should put into place proper internal channels that offer legitimate protection 
to employees who reasonably believe that there is mismanagement to report it. However, under Garcetti, 
such channels may be interpreted as part of an employee’s “job duties” 
and then the employee loses constitutional protection. Thus, the employee is safer reporting the misman-
agement to external sources like the media. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 at 435. 
196 See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); Marsh v. State of Ala., 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) 
(“When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy 
freedom of press and religion, as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a 
preferred position.”). Note, the public employee speech cases use the word ‘efficiency’ when discussing 
balancing the government and employee interests. The author purposely chose ‘efficacy,’ because sti-
fling speech may make the government run smoother, but it may not be as effective in serving the public 
need. See infra. 
197 See supra note 5–6 and accompanying text; see e.g. TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 
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Finally, in cases of speech that is a product of one’s employment, the in-
terests will be balanced and the government would only need to show an 
important justification to act.198 This would protect cases where employees 
report government gross mismanagement, violations or public safety con-
cerns. The speech will be protected as it outweighs the government’s mana-
gerial prerogative and promotes public interest in effective government. 
The proposed test may also protect other speech that is critical of an em-
ployer that is a matter of public concern, if that is the sole grounds for dis-
missal (such as critiquing personnel decisions and funding).199   
V.  CONCLUSION  
The First Amendment was created “to assure unfettered interchange of 
ideas for the brining about of political and societal change desired by the 
people.”200 Over the last, fifty years, the U.S. Supreme Court has deeply in-
tegrated this principle into its public employee speech doctrine.201  The 
Court has consistently held that “[t]here is considerable value . . . in en-
couraging, rather than inhibiting, speech by public employees. For govern-
ment employees are often in the best position to know what ails the agen-
cies for which they work.”202  
In the last decade, the Garcetti rule has limited public employee speech 
that pertains to matters of public concern as its expansive application did 
not protect speech that was a product of job duties. This created a conflict 
as the application of Garcetti erased the principles espoused in the public 
employee speech cases. This dilemma was clearly illustrated in Lane, as he 
felt that he was fired for truthfully testifying in court.203 The U.S. Supreme 
Court agreed that such action would violate the First Amendment, so it cre-
ated a narrow exception to Garcetti. But the Court did not go far enough. 
The employee speech doctrine still relies on the nebulous concept of job du-
ties. It still allows for lower courts to extend the definition of job duties to 
																														 																														 																														 																														 															
U.S.C. 2000E-2 (West 2014). 
198 See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (holding that the 
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include speech that is a product of one’s employ (with the exception of sub-
poenaed testimony). It still does not protect truthful testimony if it is pursu-
ant to one’s job duties.    
This article argued that the Court should have gone beyond drafting such 
a narrow exception. The Court should have refocused the emphasis of the 
employee speech doctrine back toward whether or not the speech was a 
matter of public concern. Then there should be two levels of scrutiny de-
pending on whether the speech was made as a citizen or if it was a product 
of employment.  This would protect speech that serves the public interest, 
while maintaining some prerogative for government management.   
Ultimately, a public employee does works for a government and does 
give up some rights in fulfilling his or her job duties.204  But, the em-
ployee’s duty should not be to the individual government manager or 
agency.  Instead, the public employee’s duty should be to the public to 
whom that government answers.205 	
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